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PARADIGMS OF COGNITIVE INTERVIEWING 
PRACTICE, AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 




lthough cognitive interviewing has emerged as a major method to identify and 
correct problems with survey questionnaires, researchers who employ the method 
seem to lack consensus on several important points. There does not appear to be a 
commonly accepted definition of what cognitive interviewing is; we also lack detailed 
knowledge about what actually happens in cognitive interviews, other than the general 
notion that people “think out loud” and possibly probe for additional information about 
the meaning of responses, how people come up with answers, difficulties they have, and 
so on. 
A definition that seems consistent with its most common application is as follows: 
cognitive interviewing entails administering a draft survey questionnaire while collecting 
additional verbal information about the survey responses, which is used to evaluate the 
quality of the response, or to help determine whether the question is generating the sort of 
information that its author intends. But beyond this general categorization, cognitive 
interviewing potentially includes different activities that may be based on different 
assumptions about the type of data that is being collected and the role of the interviewer 
in that process. For example, the verbal material generated by such interviews could 
consist of respondent elaborations regarding how they constructed their answers, 
explanations of what they interpret the questions to mean, reports of any difficulties they 
had answering, or anything else that sheds light on the broader circumstances that their 
answers were based upon. This material could be based on explicit follow-up questions 
(or probes) from an interviewer, or based on general instructions to “think out loud” as 
A 




much as possible. The interviewer herself could range from a relatively unskilled data 
collector to an expert investigator; the interview could be based on a scripted protocol, 
semi-scripted, or largely improvised based on the issues that emerge from discussion. 
Analysis may be based on systematic review of interview transcripts, or entirely from 
notes taken during the interview. The various permutations of these activities and their 
underlying assumptions could lead to quite different products, but all could apparently 
fall under the rubric of “cognitive interviewing.” 
Given such variety, it may be difficult to understand what someone means when claiming 
to have conducted cognitive interviews. Furthermore, a lack of consensus on objectives, 
procedures, or even general terminology can inhibit methodological developments. The 
major goal of this paper is to lay the groundwork for continued discussion about cognitive 
interviewing methodology by reviewing what it is, where it came from, and where it may 
be going. One potentially useful approach is to consider cognitive interviewing as falling 
into one of two major paradigms. The first of these paradigms has apparent roots in 
psychological laboratory methods, while the latter is more strongly rooted in the tradition 
of “intensive interviewing.” After reviewing these paradigms, it will be possible to 
critically evaluate cognitive interviewing in its various guises – what it accomplishes, 
what it does not, and some of the key assumptions that its practitioners make when 
employing the method. The discussion will touch on numerous components of cognitive 
interview practice, including the role of the interviewer, selection of interviewees, data 
collection procedures, and evaluation of cognitive interview data.  
2. Emergence of Cognitive Interviewing 
By the mid 1980s, survey researchers had accumulated considerable knowledge about 
survey questions, but significant limitations remained – for example, they had limited 
knowledge about the mechanisms involved in response effects. Specific guidance for 
writing survey questions was still largely dictated by common sense and the experience of 
individual researchers. Basic field pretests appeared to be the most commonly used 
method for evaluating draft survey questions. 
A seminar known as the first “CASM” meeting (for Cognitive Aspects of Survey 
Methodology) assembled survey researchers and cognitive psychologists in 1983 at 
St. Michaels, Maryland. The influential report from this meeting, Cognitive Aspects of 
Survey Methodology: Building a Bridge Across Disciplines (Jabine/Straf/Tanur/ 
Tourangeau, 1984) proposed a number of important interdisciplinary collaborations. The 
report also introduced a four-stage model explaining how respondents are likely to answer 
survey questions: they must comprehend the question, recall relevant information, judge 
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the appropriateness of the information available to the particular question, and respond in 
the format provided (Tourangeau, 1984). This model, now widely adopted by 
methodologists (and expanded in Tourangeau, Rips and Raskinski, 2000), offers 
considerable help for both researchers and questionnaire designers, who can evaluate how 
well questions work with regard to each of these components. While these developments 
were taking place, researchers at the Center for Surveys, Methods, and Analysis (ZUMA) 
in Mannheim, West Germany, were considering similar ideas and held a conference of 
their own, with largely new participants. The resulting volume, Social Information 
Processing and Survey Methodology (Hippler/Schwarz/Sudman, 1987), presented some 
of the first substantive findings from collaborations between survey methodology and 
cognitive psychology.  
Back in the U.S., the National Science Foundation (NSF) had funded several new 
collaborative research projects in the wake of the CASM meeting. One such project 
explored how principles of cognitive psychology might be applied in a laboratory setting 
toward the development and evaluation of questions on the National Health Interview 
Survey, which is conducted by the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) (Lessler/ 
Tourangeau/Salter, 1989). Additional funds from NSF were used to establish a “cognitive 
laboratory” at NCHS. Staff of this facility would evaluate and pretest questionnaires on a 
regular basis, in addition to investigating question-based response errors. Soon thereafter, 
similar laboratories were established at the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Census 
Bureau, (Dippo/Norwood, 1992), to be followed by laboratories in academic and 
commercial research organizations (Forsyth/Lessler, 1991; Sirken/Schechter, 1999). 
Cognitive interviewing is the most common activity conducted in these laboratories.  
3. Paradigms of Cognitive Interview Practice 
It may be useful to distinguish between two general paradigms of cognitive interviewing. 
One involves a cognitive interviewer whose role is to encourage participants to verbalize 
their thoughts as they come to mind, but to intervene as little as possible in generating this 
verbal information. The other involves an interviewer who asks additional, direct 
questions about responses and who may assume greater responsibility for guiding a 
discussion about the basis for responses. The former paradigm relies almost entirely upon 
the think-aloud procedure, in which interviewers encourage participants to verbalize 
thoughts while answering questions (e.g., “tell me what you are thinking... how are you 
coming up with your answer to this?”). The latter paradigm relies more heavily on 
follow-up probes administered after the participant has answered the question (e.g., “can 
you tell me in your own words what that question was asking?”), although think-alouds 
may be encouraged to provide supplemental information. Below, I consider the origins 
and general parameters of both of these paradigms. 




The “pure” think-aloud and non-intervening cognitive interviewer 
The original paradigm of cognitive interviewing was explicitly psychological. Loftus 
(1984), elaborating upon ideas presented at the first “CASM” meeting, proposed that a 
technique known as protocol analysis could be adapted as a pretesting methodology for 
survey questions. The blueprint for this technique was developed by Ericsson/Simon 
(1980; expanded in 1993) and relies heavily upon think-aloud reports. Think-aloud 
reports were used to yield insights into the thought processes involved in participants’ 
completion of certain tasks in a laboratory setting. Loftus reported that protocol analysis 
of think-alouds yielded information about how participants tended to retrieve memories 
of medical visits, and this information was used to develop question wordings that 
reflected these retrieval strategies. For example, she suggested defining the reference 
period of recall questions from a past date up to the present, rather than from the present 
backwards.  
Early papers on cognitive laboratory methods (e.g., Royston/Bercini/Sirken/Mingay, 
1986) suggest that initial cognitive interviews were based heavily, if not exclusively, upon 
thinking-aloud. In practice, this meant that cognitive laboratory participants would be 
asked to report what they were thinking while answering survey questions, and 
interviewers would simply remind respondents to continue providing such information as 
necessary. Think-aloud responses were therefore the unique data products of the 
interviews, and interviewer behavior was constrained accordingly.  
An alternative paradigm: interviewers asking direct questions about 
responses 
At some point, an alternative paradigm of cognitive interviewing emerged that expanded 
upon the use of “pure” think-alouds – in particular, allowing for the addition of direct 
probing by the interviewer. Apparently, the distinction between true think-aloud 
interviews and “intensive interviews” (which had been used to evaluate questionnaires 
prior to the CASM meetings – see DeMaio, 1983) became blurred, with both eventually 
falling under the header of “cognitive interviewing.” It is easy to imagine how this could 
have occurred, especially if the intensive probes used could be construed as “cognitive” – 
addressing how terms were interpreted, how participants remembered certain facts, 
whether answers fit into available response categories, and so on.  
This paradigm seems to have emerged gradually. Most descriptions of cognitive 
interviewing in the early 1990s (Forsyth/Lessler, 1991; Bercini, 1992) focus on think-
alouds as the dominant component of cognitive interviewing, mentioning the possibility 
of probing for supplemental purposes – although Willis/Royston/Bercini (1991) suggest 
that both think-alouds and probing could both be viable alternatives. Later, Willis (1994) 
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proposed putting a greater emphasis on probing. Several other articles suggest that the 
trend toward acceptance of such activities continued: Gerber/Wellens (1997), for 
example, noted that cognitive interviewing had seemed to evolve from its original form to 
include “more probes and probes about meaning than was originally intended” (p. 35). 
Willis/ DeMaio/Harris-Kojetin (1999), noting that cognitive interviews are often called 
“think-aloud interviews,” recommended that the latter term should be used more 
sparingly because think-aloud protocols were not necessarily the dominant component of 
cognitive interviews as currently practiced. And, Beatty (in press) concluded that 
cognitive interviews conducted in a study at NCHS relied heavily on interviewer 
adaptation to particulars that emerged in individual interviews.  
Taken together, these works suggest that some practitioners of cognitive interviewing 
adopted a paradigm allowing for the collection of additional verbal material other than 
“pure” think-alouds, and at least in some cases, empowering the interviewer to guide the 
content of interviews. This is not to say that the use of think-alouds was abandoned, since 
virtually all descriptions of cognitive interviewing mention think-alouds as one possible 
component. It is also not to say that this paradigm completely replaced the alternative one 
firmly rooted in think-alouds, as Conrad/Blair/Tracy (2000), among others, clearly favor 
the original approach. Rather, another paradigm emerged, one that in practice owed 
relatively little allegiance to the procedures for verbal protocol analysis proposed by 
Ericsson and Simon. 
The goal under both paradigms is to generate verbal information that is usually unseen in 
a survey interview in order to evaluate how well the questions are meeting their 
objectives. This puts both paradigms on an important common ground. Yet they are 
carried out differently and are based on some different assumptions, which may have 
implications regarding the data that they generate. It is therefore worthwhile to consider 
the rationales offered for both paradigms. 
An assessment of the two paradigms 
Advocates of the original paradigm propose that is has several advantages. One advantage 
proposed by Conrad/Blair/Tracy (2000) is that relying only on thinking-aloud avoids 
problems with artificiality that can arise due to interviewer probing. It is virtually 
indisputable that inserting probes into the middle of a survey interview alters the content 
and flow of the interaction. Such alteration of the realistic flow is the major reason why 
Oksenberg/Cannell/Kalton (1991) proposed that probing should be used after only a few 
questions per interview. 




Forsyth/Lessler (1991) and van der Veer/Hak/Jansen (2002) are among those who propose 
an additional advantage: that think-aloud data are preferable because they are collected 
during the response process, and therefore have a certain purity that probe responses 
(provided after responding) do not. However, there is a considerable body of research 
beginning with Nisbett/Wilson (1977) that calls into question whether think-alouds are 
literal reflections of actual thought processes. More likely, they are re-constructions 
created after the fact. For the most part, they are likely to be reasonable reflections of 
actual processes (Wilson/LaFleur/Anderson, 1996) – but not necessarily literal 
representations. Furthermore, as Willis (in press) notes, Ericsson/Simon (1980) 
themselves did not insist upon exclusive use of thinking-aloud: their crucial point was 
that self-reported information should be in short-term memory (as opposed to long-term). 
From that perspective, reports based on probes immediately following questions are 
probably not much different than think-aloud reports. Both are approximations of “the 
real thing.” 
Advocates of the more probing-centered paradigm suggest that the alternative has 
particular advantages as well. One is that probing may provide necessary focus to 
cognitive interview interactions. Willis (1994) suggests that thinking aloud often leads 
participants to diverge onto irrelevant tangents. The most efficient way to correct this 
problem is through probes selected to re-focus attention on pertinent issues. Of course, 
doing so requires interviewer judgment. This is important, because it is not the use of 
probes per se that regain control of the interview, but an interviewer skilled at using the 
“right” probes. What Willis is really advocating is interviewer discretion in guiding the 
interview content.  
Another potential advantage of probing is that it may have less of an impact on the 
response process than thinking-aloud. Although the actual content of probe responses is 
probably quite similar to that of think-alouds (see above), procedures for obtaining them 
are different; in the think-aloud case, participants at least attempt to provide some verbal 
information prior to responding to the question. According to Ericsson/Simon (1980), 
thinking-aloud should not interfere with the response process. However, Russo/Johnson/ 
Stephens (1989) found that thinking aloud did have an impact on the accuracy of various 
mental computations; furthermore, Willis (1994) argues that thinking aloud increases the 
effort spent on creating a response, which has an unknown impact on the response 
process.  
Perhaps the strongest justification for the more probe-based paradigm is that it generates 
verbal material that questionnaire designers find useful, but that may not emerge unless a 
cognitive interviewer specifically asks for it. As Willis (in press) observes, think-aloud 
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procedures were originally proposed by Loftus (1984) to shed light specifically on 
retrieval processes. However, the cognitive model proposed by Tourangeau (1984) also 
addresses comprehension, estimation/judgement strategies, and selection of particular 
responses. Even if think-alouds are effective at illuminating retrieval processes, they may 
not consistently generate information about these other issues. For example, participants 
might not explicitly consider the meanings of words or phrases while answering 
questions, and might not recognize their own misunderstandings. Also, Conrad/Blair/ 
Tracy (2000) note that think-alouds alone sometimes suggest a problem with a question 
without providing enough information to diagnose what the problem is. Probe responses 
might help to fill in this gap.  
Today, the original distinction between the paradigms (thinking-aloud vs. probing) is 
probably not of central importance. Advocates of the original paradigm (Conrad/Blair/ 
Tracy, 2000) have conceded that probing makes important contributions, and advocates of 
the alternative (Beatty, in press) have acknowledged that probing can shape interview 
content in some undesirable ways. Most conceptualizations of cognitive interviewing 
today include some degree of probing. The primary distinction is now between an 
unobtrusive cognitive interviewer, who relies on standardized think-aloud protocols and 
possibly scripted probes, and an active cognitive interviewer, who is given more latitude 
to explore topics as they emerge within interviews. The practical decision has moved 
from whether or not to allow probes, to how much probing is appropriate, whether this 
probing should be standardized or determined by interviewer judgment (or to what 
extent), and how researchers should select the most appropriate probes for various 
purposes. The remainder of this paper considers how researchers might make these and 
other decisions in applying cognitive interviewing methodology. 
4. Toward More Specific Practical Guildelines 
While Forsyth/Lessler (1991), Willis (1994), and DeMaio/Rothgeb (1996), among others, 
have contributed significantly to establishing general parameters of cognitive 
interviewing, the literature is almost silent about many specifics regarding the design, 
implementation, and analysis of studies based upon this method. Guidance regarding the 
probing decisions mentioned above would be useful, as would guidance about the ideal 
background and training of interviewers, how many interviews are required to adequately 
test a questionnaire, and how participants should be selected.  




Cognitive interviewers as data collectors vs. investigators 
Tucker (1997) – in a position largely consistent with the original paradigm discussed 
earlier – calls for much greater standardization of cognitive interview procedures. Without 
this, he argues that “effective manipulation [of variables] will be impossible... the notion 
of falsifiability has no meaning... [and] the conditions necessary for generalizability will 
be absent” (p. 72). Conrad/Blair (1996) similarly argue that “rigorous experimental 
methods that rely on objective quantifiable data” are preferable to “largely impressionistic 
methods” that they suggest are generally used in cognitive laboratories (p. 8). Under this 
perspective, creative contributions from interviewers that lead to non-standardized 
behavior are undesirable. Given that interviewers would be constrained against 
improvising, the investigative burden is clearly on the front-end, meaning that researchers 
would need to determine in advance any issue they wished to probe about. 
An alternative perspective is that interviewers themselves may serve as investigators. For 
example, Willis (1994) compares cognitive interviewers to “detectives” who rely at least 
partially upon improvisation in looking for clues about questionnaire problems. In 
subsequent work, he draws an analogy between cognitive and clinical interviews, which 
may be guided by intuition, experience, and flexibility (Willis, in press). This perspective 
forgoes consistency across interviews in favor of freedom to explore issues that emerge in 
discussions with participants. Presumably its major advantage is that it allows 
interviewers to explore issues that emerge within the interview, were not anticipated in 
advance, and might be missed through more scripted interviews. While this perspective 
does not preclude identifying some issues to be watchful for in advance, it does place 
considerable trust in the interviewer’s ability to notice potential problems and to conduct 
emergent probing in ways that shed light on the sources of these problems. Thus the 
interviewer takes on some of the role of investigator as well as data collector. 
These two perspectives might call for very different sorts of cognitive interviewers, with 
potentially different skills, backgrounds, and training. The skills necessary for data-
collection cognitive interviewers might not be much different than those of survey 
interviewers – e.g., they would require training in general procedures, but not in the 
subject matter being investigated (Fowler/Mangione, 1990). They would not have to 
know why think-alouds or probes were being administered – only to recognize when 
participants were providing adequate think-aloud or probe responses. 
For investigative cognitive interviewers, such skills would be necessary but not sufficient, 
since they would at least partially determine the content of the interview. In doing so, 
such interviewers might need to draw upon knowledge of the objectives of the questions, 
potential types of cognitive or communicative errors that could affect the accuracy of 
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survey responses, and familiarity with various options for eliciting useful verbal material 
from participants. Strangely, the literature on cognitive interviewing does not seem to 
address the appropriate background of such cognitive interviewers. A solid grounding in 
survey methodology would probably be useful, since interviewers would generally be 
working in an environment geared toward producing survey statistics, and presenting 
their conclusions to professionals in that field. It would be useful for advocates of this 
type of cognitive interviewing to think clearly about what other skills or background are 
most desirable for identifying effective interviewers.  
What to ask: the selection of probes 
As discussed earlier, most recent conceptualizations of cognitive interviewing involve 
probing to some degree. If the interviewer is also an investigator, then she may select 
some of these probes herself; if a data collector, then the probes may be selected for her. 
But either way, someone must choose what probes are used. Although cognitive 
interviewing literature provides many examples of possible probes, it provides little 
guidance regarding which probes are likely to be most effective for various purposes. A 
few basic guidelines are available: for example, Willis (1994) notes that probes should not 
suggest a “correct” answer, a principle that also applies to survey questions. Foddy (1998) 
concludes that specific probes such as “what does [term] mean to you?” are more 
effective than general ones such as “what were you thinking when you first answered the 
question?” In another recent study, Beatty (2002) found that participants answered probes 
about the meaning of terms differently when they were administered alone than they did 
within the context of a particular survey question. However, these sort of 
recommendations appear to be uncommon, and almost completely missing from 
published literature in this area. 
Cognitive interviewers may be able to obtain some guidance about how to choose “good” 
probes from literature on qualitative interviewing, which may include lessons on what to 
ask, how to ask it, and how to make sense of narrative data. For example, Weiss (1994) 
suggests that interviewers generate narrative by asking about specific events rather than 
generalized experience. Holstein and Gubrium (1995) encourage interviewers to be on the 
lookout for “confusion, contradictions, ambiguity and reluctance” as signs that “meanings 
are being examined, reconstituted, or resisted” (p. 79). In the case of cognitive interviews, 
such instances might call for additional probing. Variants of qualitative interviewing are 
also employed by anthropologists, and some guidance may be obtainable from that field 
as well. For example, Gerber (1999) notes that anthropologists might explore whether 
terms are “culturally inappropriate” for a particular population. But rather than simply 
asking a participant what a term such as self-reliance means, an anthropologist might 




explore its meaning in different contexts, e.g., with regard to child rearing, older family 
members, or welfare recipients. This might suggest that general cognitive interview 
probes such as “what does this term mean to you?” might be less effective than specific 
ones exploring how a term is used in a participant’s life.  
Who to interview, and how much interviewing to do 
Cognitive interviewing literature pays even less attention to issues of how to select 
samples of participants and how to determine when an adequate number of interviews 
have been completed. The lack of attention to this issue is likely a consequence of its 
association with psychological laboratory methods, which have often placed little 
emphasis on such matters. Cognitive interview practitioners generally acknowledge that 
participants are chosen by convenience and that such samples are “not designed to be 
representative [of any larger population], but to reflect the detailed thoughts and problems 
of the few respondents who participate in [cognitive interviews]” (DeMaio/Mathiowetz/ 
Rothgeb/Beach/Durant, 1993). 
Other than that, the only specific guidance that seems to be available is that some 
demographic variety of respondents is desirable, and that participants should include 
people relevant to the topic of the questionnaire being tested (Willis, 1994). One clear 
consequence of such sampling is that cognitive interviewing can never determine the 
extent of questionnaire problems in a population. Still, some sampling considerations 
could help to strengthen claims that a reasonably thorough effort has been made to 
identify the most pressing problems with a questionnaire. 
For example, participants could be selected to cover as much of a questionnaire’s 
conceptual terrain as possible. If questionnaires include skip patterns that lead to various 
branches, the sample should be sufficiently diverse to explore all of these different paths. 
Whatever topic the questions focus on (e.g., health insurance), the sample should cover a 
variety of circumstances relevant to that topic (e.g., people with a variety of health 
insurance situations). Within those parameters, it also seems desirable to select 
participants representing some demographic variety. Practitioners should not operate 
under the illusion that such diversity ensures “representativeness”; it only casts a wider 
net over varying circumstances, maximizing the chances that discovery will be effective. 
Similarly, interviewing in multiple locations could improve the variety of circumstances 
that are captured in testing.  
As for what constitutes an adequate cognitive interview sample size, little guidance has 
been offered on this point either – often, literature in this area simply acknowledges that 
samples are small. Several researchers report that cognitive interviews are commonly 
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divided among several “rounds” consisting of about 10 interviews each (Willis, 1994; 
McColl, 2001). Such small rounds of interviews are considered sufficient to identify some 
questionnaire problems, at which point questionnaires can be revised and tested again in 
subsequent rounds. This iterative approach seems useful, but it still leaves open the 
question of whether researchers can determine when they have conducted enough rounds 
of interviews to stop the process. Some qualitative researchers make decisions regarding 
when enough interviews have been conducted based on the idea of category saturation 
(Strauss/Corbin, 1990). Put simply, this means that the researcher identifies groups of 
people most relevant to the study and conducts interviews with members of each until 
they yield relatively few new insights. In other words, operating under a principle of 
diminishing returns may be effective. Operating in this manner makes a very important 
assumption: that the most critical questionnaire problems will be revealed quickly from 
virtually any group of relevant participants. This assumption is most likely to hold up if 
participants reflect a range of experiences that a question attempts to measure, and also 
represent at least an attempt to obtain some demographic diversity. These are not 
guarantees of representativeness. Rather, they are guidelines that maximize the chances of 
discovering potential questionnaire problems as efficiently as possible. Still, greater 
attention to how participants are selected and how many of them should be interviewed 
could maximize cognitive interviewing’s potential to quickly home in on the most 
significant problems with a particular questionnaire. 
Evaluating evidence from cognitive interviews 
Whether cognitive interviews are conducted based on a fairly standardized protocol or 
with greater interviewer flexibility, the result is still verbal text that needs to be evaluated 
to determine whether or not a question poses a problem for respondents. One advantage 
of fairly standardized protocols is that they allow for more systematic analysis. For 
example, Conrad/Blair (1996) propose that verbal protocols be coded in a table with 
“types of problems” on one axis (lexical, temporal, logical, etc.), and “response stage” 
(understanding, task performance, and response formatting) on the other. Whenever 
problems were observed answering a question, they would be coded in the appropriate 
category. Of course, the success of this procedure (and others like it) is based on the 
assumption that the interviewing technique brings cognitive problems to the surface so 
that they can be observed. It also assumes that an analyst will be able to make enough 
sense of these verbalizations to code them appropriately. 
As we have seen, some may counter-argue that additional probing from a skilled 
investigator brings enough additional material to the surface to justify the lack of 
standardization – that is, the above procedure would miss some important observations. 




The resulting data may be harder to interpret and it may be harder to judge whether a 
problem is “real.” One possibility for evaluating questionnaire problems is that attempts 
should be made to link them to characteristics of the question. For example, consider the 
survey question “Thinking about your physical health, which includes physical illness 
and injury, for how many days during the past 30 days was your physical health not 
good?” Schechter/Beatty/Willis (1998) concluded that respondents might have a difficult 
time answering this. The conclusion can be backed up by the following process of 
reasoning: 
• observation of a problem: several participants could not provide codeable responses 
(a number between zero and thirty), even when probed. 
• studying the specifics of the problem: some participants indicated that the question did 
not allow them to answer in meaningful terms (“a day is part good and part bad – you 
can’t characterize it as one or the other”); others complained about response task 
difficulty (“I don’t do bookkeeping on this”), especially given complicated health 
status. 
• identifying the question characteristic that is the source of the problem: the question 
is based on the assumption that a “day” is a reasonable metric, but it may not be for 
people with varying-quality days.  
• determining whether this is this generalizable: it seems reasonable that this problem 
could recur, e.g., for people who experience health problems that bother them at 
various times during the day, or people with multiple intermittent health problems. 
Claiming that this process found “proof” of the problem would be overstating the 
evidence. However, a reasonable case could be made that the problem is likely to be 
found in respondents with similar circumstances, and is created by a faulty assumption 
about the way individuals think about their health. Note also that the evidence is not 
linked to the number of participants who report a particular problem. Whether it takes 
many or a few participants to construct such an argument, it needs to be evaluated based 
on logical merits. It is conceivable that a solid argument about a questionnaire problem 
could be constructed around a single case, or that such an argument might fail to 
materialize around several. 
Error in cognitive interview analysis 
Still, since the method does rely heavily upon human judgment, the possibility that 
cognitive interviewing could lead to conclusions that are incomplete, misleading, or 
incorrect must be addressed. There are several possibilities for error: cognitive interviews 
could identify problems that would not turn out to be “real” in surveys; cognitive 
interviews could fail to identify problems that exist in actual survey administration; and, 
cognitive interview findings might be inconsistent when conducted by independent 
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groups of researchers. The first two could be considered problems with the validity of the 
method and might be respectively classified as errors of commission and errors of 
omission. The third could be considered to be a problem with the reliability of the 
method. 
Practitioners of cognitive interviewing make several assumptions to defend themselves 
against the possibility of errors of commission. One is that cognitive interviewing finds 
problems that will carry over to actual surveys. Unfortunately, there is often no obvious 
way to verify that hypothesized problems are “real.” Logical arguments may have to do, 
and researchers will have to determine for themselves whether they find such arguments 
to be meritorious. However, there has been at least one attempt to verify that cognitive 
interview findings were borne out by field data (Willis/Schechter, 1997). They revised 
questions based on cognitive interview findings, and the results were more plausible than 
statistics from the original question – however, such efforts are expensive and the results 
are not always conclusive.  
Another potential concern is that cognitive interviewing could fail to find problems that 
would actually appear in survey interviews. Actually, there is no reasonable way that 
cognitive interview practitioners could claim to have found all problems with a 
questionnaire. Its usefulness is based on the assumption that the most egregious problems 
will become evident in most groups of participants who are reasonably appropriate to the 
topic of the survey. Interviewing often concludes based on a subjective judgment that 
interviews are yielding diminishing returns. However, there is always the possibility that 
one additional interview could yield a significant new insight, or that an additional 
interviewer would be more likely to notice additional problems. By the same token, 
claims that a questionnaire has “no problems” are impossible – the strongest claim that 
could be made is that no problems have (yet) been discovered.  
Finally, there is always the possibility that independent groups of cognitive interview 
practitioners might not reach the same conclusions about a questionnaire. However, it 
would probably not be unusual for different groups to discover different insights, 
especially if interviewers were operating under an “investigator” paradigm. Differences 
could be a function of different interviewer backgrounds and sensitivities to various sorts 
of problems. Hopefully, however, the findings of different groups would not be wildly 
incompatible (e.g., with one group finding a series of comprehension and recall problems, 
and another finding no problems even after many interviews).  
On a related note, one potential view of cognitive interviewing is that its objective is to 
identify and eliminate all of the problems with a question, and that by doing so we can 
find the “ideal” question to ask. However, an alternative view is that researchers could 




reach very different conclusions about the quality of a certain question, both of which 
could be correct. Rather than attempting to find the “right” way to ask a survey question, 
cognitive interviewing may be more suited to helping researchers assess the advantages 
and disadvantages of asking questions in a certain manner – and helping researchers make 
decisions based on the potential errors they are more comfortable with. Questionnaire 
designers actually make these decisions all the time (e.g., adding verbiage to a question 
might clarify its intent, but doing so could also make it longer and more burdensome). It 
may be that cognitive interviewing proves to be useful simply because it provides 
information to make such design decisions as logically as possible, some of which might 
not be available through other pretesting methods. In other words, cognitive interviewing 
may be less suited to finding the “best” questions than guiding “best informed” design 
decisions.  
It seems unlikely that cognitive interviewing will generate “reliable” findings in the sense 
that survey researchers might use the term (i.e., each set of interviews identifies the same 
set of problems with questions). When findings are different, yet not necessarily 
contradictory, this may indicate that no one set of findings is complete – the different 
findings should be examined to see whether they complement or refute each other. 
Findings that are difficult to reconcile might indicate either faulty reasoning by analysts, 
or that interviewing has not yet yielded an adequate understanding of responses 
associated with a question. The former case calls for a closer look at the data, while the 
latter indicates a need for continued data collection. 
5. Conclusions and overall assessment 
Since its inception in the mid 1980s, cognitive interviewing has become a prominent 
method for survey questionnaire development and evaluation. It should be clear from the 
preceding review that cognitive interviewing is not so much one clearly defined method 
as a loose collection of several potential activities. These activities have a great deal in 
common – all involve the collection of verbal material beyond a simple survey response, 
which is used to evaluate whether questions are capturing information as intended. Yet 
there are also important differences in both philosophy and practice.  
Reasonable arguments have been offered for both the data-collector and investigator 
paradigms of cognitive interviewing. Clearly both positions offer some advantages. Both 
also have shortcomings that could be addressed more thoroughly by their respective 
advocates. Discussions about best practices need to continue. With such continued 
discussions, researchers should be better equipped to use cognitive interviewing to help 
create questions that are clear, pose memory and recall tasks that respondents can 
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